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We analyse the influence of institutional restrictions on bureaucratic rents. As a
measure for these rents, we propose subjective well-being differentials between
workers in the public administration and workers in other industries. Based on data
for the US states, we estimate the extent to which institutional efforts to strengthen
bureaucratic accountability affect differences in well-being. We find that well-being
differences are smaller in states with high transparency, elected auditors, and legal
deficit carryover restrictions. These findings are consistent with limited rent
extraction under these institutional conditions. No or weak effects are found for per-
formance audits and regulatory review.
JEL classifications: D72, D73, I31, J45.
1. Introduction
We study how effectively government institutions in US states restrict public ad-
ministrators in the pursuit of private interests and the acquisition of rents.
Specifically, we address how alternative fiscal transparency regimes, selection
rules and mandates of state auditors, balanced-budget laws, and restraints to ad-
ministrative rule-making affect the rents of public servants. As a direct measure for
rents, we exploit differences in the reported subjective well-being of employees in
the public administration and employees in other industries. This measure has been
introduced and applied in a cross-country framework by Luechinger et al. (2008).
Using data from the National Survey of Families and Households, we estimate
interaction effects between institutional restrictions and the status of being
employed in the public administration. The interaction effects capture well-being
differences that systematically correlate with governance institutions. In our main
analysis for the years 1992-4, we find that in US states with high transparency
regimes, elected auditors, and balanced-budget laws the difference in subjective
well-being between employees in the public administration and employees in
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other industries is substantially smaller. The findings are consistent with limited
rent extraction under these institutional conditions. We find no correlation of the
subjective well-being differentials with performance audits and sometimes weak
negative correlations with regulatory review by the legislature and independent
commissions. The results are robust to various changes in the specification and
sample. However, one caveat should be mentioned upfront: we cannot replicate our
results in a smaller sample and a smaller set of states for the years 1987–8.
Section 2 presents the theoretical considerations on the role of specific
democratic institutions for bureaucratic rents. Section 3 explains the empirical
strategy and Section 4 describes the data. The results of our main empirical
analysis as well as the robustness checks and the extensions are reported in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Institutions and bureaucratic rents
The sovereign authority of the public bureaucracy in providing public services
offers employees in the public administration the opportunity to generate rents.
In contrast to a model of a benevolent bureaucracy, a political economy view pre-
dicts that public administrators will acquire those rents and protect them against
dissipation. Moreover, the pursuit of rents does not simply lead to transfers. As the
extraction of rents often involves investments of valuable resources, there are fewer
resources available for productive economic activity, entailing Pareto-inferior
outcomes. Opportunities for bureaucratic rent-seeking are manifold and tied to
the several tiers of principal-agent relationships between individual employees,
managers, elected officials, and voters. First, the multiplicities of principals, tasks,
and tiers of management and front-line workers characterizing government
bureaus hamper the use of explicit incentives for aligning the interests of
individual public servants and their superiors (Dixit, 2002). Moreover, output is
difficult to measure because of its non-market nature. These aspects of the organ-
izational structure in the government sector enable subordinates to renege on
public work effort in order to pursue personal goals, giving them higher utility
than when strictly pursuing agency goals. Second, informational asymmetries give
administrators considerable discretion vis-a`-vis the legislature, which allows them
to pursue their own goals via budget and slack maximization (Niskanen, 1971).
Finally, public agencies are responsible for rulemaking and policy implementation,
making them attractive targets for rent-seeking activities and enabling them to sell
property rights created by legislation.
To organize ideas and to motivate our empirical approach, we set up a very
simple framework which captures the basic features of our empirical strategy.
Bureaucrats can use their budget (public funds) B to provide public goods
G and to finance rents R ¼ B G. Rent seeking is discovered with probabil-
ity  2 ½0, 1Þ, in which case bureaucrats get no rent but need to pay a penalty
P. The probability  is increasing with better observability of the agent due to,
e.g., tighter transparency and supervision standards. Hence,  might be seen as
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a proxy for such institutions. The citizens’ payoff is u Gð Þ and the bureaucrats’
payoff is w G,Rð Þ ¼ u Gð Þ þ 1  ð Þ 1  ð Þv Rð Þ  P, where u0 Gð Þ > 0, u00 Gð Þ <
0, v0 Rð Þ > 0, v00 Rð Þ < 0.
The bureaucrats’ maximization problem is: maxGwðG, 1  GÞ. The first-order
condition is u0 Gð Þ  1  ð Þ 1  ð Þv0 Rð Þ ¼ 0 , u0 Gð Þ ¼ 1 1  ð Þv0ðRÞ.
Assuming an interior solution, it follows from this first-order condition and the
concavity of u Gð Þ and v Rð Þ that the optimal public goods provision G is unique
and increasing in  and . The optimal rent R ¼ B G must thus be decreasing
in  and . Hence, better institutions lead to higher public goods provision and less
rent seeking.
The empirical analysis in the paper focuses on subjective well-being differen-
tials which proxy for the utility differential  G,Rð Þ  w G,Rð Þ  u Gð Þ ¼
1  ð Þ 1  ð Þv Rð Þ  u Gð Þ½   P. It follows from the above results that ðGÞ
must be decreasing in . Hence, this simple static framework predicts that better
institutions lead to a lower utility differential between public administrators and
citizens.
We identify four major institutions that are expected to affect the probability of
detection  and might thus help aligning the incentives of employees in the public
administration with citizens’ preferences. The institutions aim at reducing infor-
mation asymmetries or at strengthening politicians’ incentives and ability to
control the public administration.
2.1 Fiscal transparency
Information asymmetries in the democratic decision-making process are a major
obstacle to holding public servants accountable. Proposed remedies are stricter
transparency requirements mandating information disclosure as well as the
subsequent review of such disclosed information by public auditors (see below
for the latter aspect). Increased transparency involves the disclosure and access to
reliable, comprehensive, and timely information and allows the legislature and
other stakeholders to better observe the workings of government. In general, the
beneficial effects of transparency requirements stem from the improved predict-
ability and credibility of political processes. However, there are also
counterarguments asserting that transparency inhibits politicians and public
servants from taking productive risks and breaking promises in the interest of
political expediency as more decisions become politicized (for a discussion, see
Alt et al., 2006). Previous empirical evidence supports the favourable effects of
increased transparency. Stricter transparency requirements are associated with
lower levels of debt accumulation (Alt and Lassen, 2006a) and smaller political
deficit cycles (Alt and Lassen, 2006b).
Hypothesis 1 Higher fiscal transparency increases the probability of detection of
rent-seeking behaviour which reduces the discretion of public administrators in the
allocation of funds and thus rents in their industry.
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2.2 Public auditors
Transparency requirements are ineffective if the disclosed information is not
accurate or timely. It is therefore important that they are backed by independent
review. The review of financial information is usually conducted by independent
public auditing institutions. These are mandated to verify and certify the financial
statements that are prepared by the bureaucracy and issued by the government. If
the audits are of poor quality or the auditor is not independent from the
government, financial statements lose credibility (e.g., Schelker, 2008).
Auditors typically conduct financial audits, in which they scrutinize financial
statements. Recent randomized field experiments show that independent
financial audits reduce corruption (Olken, 2007) and influence electoral decisions
(Ferraz and Finan, 2008). However, some auditing institutions also conduct various
forms of performance audits to ensure efficient policy implementation. With this
extended mandate, audits cover a wider range of government activities. In a study
analysing US state auditors, Schelker (2012) finds evidence that performance audits
improve government general obligation bond ratings.1
Hypothesis 2a Auditors with a supplementary mandate to conduct performance
audits review a wider range of government activities. Such mandates improve the
quality of information available to the principal and, thus, reduce information
asymmetries and bureaucratic rents.
The effectiveness of audits also depends on the auditors’ incentives to reveal
inconsistencies. In Tirole’s (1986) three-tier principal-agent model in which a
principal hires a supervisor to control the agent, the main danger arises where the
supervisor and the agent collude. In theory, the principal will aim at implementing
collusion-proof contracts. A first step towards reducing the risk of collusion is to keep
the auditor institutionally independent from government agents, most notably from
the executive and the bureaucracy, eliminating direct channels for side-payments and
reciprocal behaviour. Auditor independence is thus influenced by the appointing and
dismissal procedures (e.g., Maskin and Tirole, 2004; Schelker, 2008).
Hypothesis 2b Elected auditors have strong electoral ties to the principal—the
citizens—and are less likely than appointed auditors to collude with the
agents—the public administrators. Their independence allows effective reviewing
of publicly disclosed information, thereby reducing information asymmetries and
bureaucratic rents.
2.3 Balanced-budget rules
Fiscal rules aim at restricting the government in the budget process and are a
general response to many agency problems identified in political economics.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
1 Extending the audit mandate even further to include also ex ante audits of the budget draft and individual
policy proposals leads to significantly lower taxes and expenditures (Schelker and Eichenberger, 2010).
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Many countries, and virtually all US states, apply fiscal rules that restrict expend-
iture behaviour and the issuing of sovereign debt. The various balanced-budget
rules applied in this context differ widely: they allow borrowing over one or more
fiscal years, apply to the entire budget period or only a part of it, and are combined
with more or less formal provisions that enforce them (e.g., Poterba, 1994).
Previous evidence indicates that fiscal rules systematically affect fiscal outcomes.
Stringent balanced-budget laws contribute, for example, to lower public deficits
and to faster reactions to income shocks, thus smoothing budget surpluses and
deficits (Alt and Lowry, 1994; Poterba, 1994). More stringent balanced-budget rules
restrict a government’s ability to carry deficits to subsequent budget periods and,
hence, its scope to allocate funds over time.
Hypothesis 3 Stringent balanced-budget rules harden the budget constraint and
raise a government’s incentive to monitor the bureaucracy’s use of public funds,
thus reducing the potential abuse of funds.
2.4 Restraints to government rule making
Government agencies have the competence to set rules and regulations in many
important policy areas, from environmental protection and public health to
banking. While the discretion that administrative agencies have provides them
with the flexibility to respond to new challenges, it also allows them to pursue
private interests, and to give in to offers from regulated industries. In order to hold
agencies responsive and accountable, many jurisdictions introduce specific
procedures for reviewing new regulations (Grady and Simon, 2002).
The US states record the rule-making procedures in their State Administrative
Procedure Act. Government agencies are bound by various degrees of restraint in
their rule-making authorities. We concentrate on the political actors that constrain
agencies, i.e., the governor’s office or its designee, the office of attorney general, the
legislature, including both the committee system and the full body, and an inde-
pendent rules review entity (Grady and Simon, 2002). We are not aware of any
systematic empirical work on the consequences of a more or less strict regulatory
review process.
Hypothesis 4 The stricter the control of administrative rule-making is by any of the
several involved political actors, the lower are rents in the public administration.
Hypothesis 4 does not take into account the tendency for opposing interests to
exist between the executive branch and the legislator in a presidential system.
Opposing interests induce legislators to adopt proactive measures in order to
protect their interests within the bureaucracy. Legislators impose detailed rules of
procedure (including regulatory reviews), which cannot be easily altered by the
executive. This, however, has the overall effect of obstructing a bureaucracy’s
political control mechanisms and undermines the positive effect of regulatory
reviews stated in Hypothesis 4.
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2.5 Other potential determinants of rents
There are several other potential determinants of well-being differences between
industries. We concentrate on socio-economic factors, political preferences, and
factors related to the political process.
The socio-economic determinants refer to state income, population size, and
unemployment. The per capita income level in a state is a proxy variable for
many factors affecting political governance such as an educated citizenry or
social capital, but also the level of available resources that can potentially be
transferred between sectors. A state’s population measures the number of people
who have to be administered and, thus, reflects the magnitude of the organizational
problem from which public administrators might benefit. Due to the higher job
security of employees in the public administration relative to other industries any
difference in subjective well-being is expected to depend on the state of the
economy (Luechinger et al., 2010).
Subjective well-being in the public administration might also depend on the
population’s attitudes towards the state’s active role in various areas of life. It is
conceivable that people’s political attitudes are, in fact, responsible for the degree of
restraint imposed on a bureaucracy. In advance of the empirical analysis, note that,
when we take a state’s political orientation into account (as measured in terms of
the political position of the elected state representatives), we implicitly control for
the correlated institutional factors that we have omitted as separate variables. A
further extension of our analysis focuses specifically on citizens’ trust in state
governments.
Finally, current political factors such as electoral competition and binding term
limits might affect elected officials (short term) incentives to control the public
administration. Moreover, if unions are an effective way to organize the interests of
public administrators, they may assist in the generation and protection of rents.
Unions seem to be effective in shielding its members from wage adjustments,
general cut-backs in public employment, or from employment reductions due to
privatization of state services (e.g., Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 1997; Blanchflower and
Bryson, 2004). These latter aspects are subject of a supplementary extension of our
main analysis.
3. Empirical strategy
We approximate rents by the difference in reported subjective well-being between
workers employed by the public administration and workers in other industries.2
This approach has been introduced in Luechinger et al. (2008).
Focusing on subjective well-being allows us to capture the total net benefits of a
position in the public administration and to account for benefits beyond the
..........................................................................................................................................................................
2 Recent economic analyses based on data on subjective well-being include, e.g., Deaton (2012) and are
reviewed, e.g., in Stutzer and Frey (2010). For studies on the effect of institutional and political factors
on subjective well-being see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2005) and Dreher et al. (2010).
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respective job such as better access to public services or generous pension benefits.
This distinguishes our approach from previous research on job satisfaction of
public and private sector employees (e.g., Heywood et al., 2002).
To assess how the difference in subjective well-being between workers in the
public administration and other industries (as a proxy for  G,Rð Þ) are related to
the institutional factors, we estimate variants of the following empirical model:
SWBij ¼ 0 þ 1  1 Public adminð Þijþ2  1 Public adminð Þij ICj  IC
 
þ 3  ICj  IC
 þ 4  Zij  Z
 þ 5  1 Public adminð Þij Xj  X
 
þ 6  Xj  X
 þ "ij,
ð1Þ
where SWBij is the subjective well-being of individual i living in state j,
1 Public adminð Þij is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the respondent
is employed in the public administration and 0 otherwise, ICj is the institutional
variable of interest, and Zij and Xj are vectors of individual and state level controls,
respectively.
The individual level control variables Zij capture personal characteristics such as
sex, age, education, marital status, ethnicity, and religious orientation. Income is
not included as control variable, because it may be an important channel through
which rents are appropriated.3 If these job characteristics were held constant, the
pervasiveness of any rent in the public administration would be underestimated.
The state-level control variables Xj capture the income level in the state, its
population, the rate of unemployment and a proxy for political orientation (i.e.,
ADA score). All institutional and control variables are expressed as deviations from
their mean: ICj  IC, Zij  Z, and Xj  X. The coefficient of the constant term, 0,
can thus be interpreted as the subjective well-being of the average individual living
in a state with average characteristics, if he or she were to work in the private sector.
The coefficient 1 measures the average difference in subjective well-being between
a person employed in the public administration and a person employed in any
other industry.
The main coefficient of interest is 2. It indicates how much smaller or larger the
differential in subjective well-being for employees in the public administration is, if
some specific institutional conditions are in place or are more pronounced. The
pure level effect of institutional conditions is reflected in coefficient 3.
The effects captured by 1, 2, and 3 are subject to different identification
challenges. The average difference in subjective well-being between public admin-
istrators and employees in other industries 1 is biased to the extent that people
self-select into the public administration based on unobserved characteristics that
are correlated with their reported subjective well-being (Luechinger et al., 2006).
The institutional level effect captured with 3 is biased to the extent that other state
characteristics (which affect subjective well-being, but are not included in the
..........................................................................................................................................................................
3 As we discuss in Section 5, the results are robust to the inclusion of log income.
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estimation equation) are correlated with the specific institutional factors. Therefore
we concentrate on 2. The interaction term identifying 2 can be interpreted as an
application of a differences-in-differences estimator. Independently of any general
difference in subjective well-being between industries and any general correlation
between institutional conditions and subjective well-being, the interaction term
identifies any systematic variation in the well-being differences across states that
is correlated with institutional conditions. Since we cannot rigorously identify the
level effects of institutions on subjective well-being, we cannot rule out that insti-
tutional constraints make bureaucrats unhappy without making anyone else
happier.
To assess the robustness of our estimates, we control for unobserved state specific
heterogeneity by including state effects, we evaluate the sensitivity of our results by
excluding individual states from the estimation, we include additional covariates to
assess potential concerns related to omitted variable bias, and we extend our
analysis to address further political factors which might affect the relevant utility
differentials. Throughout, we use a robust estimator of variance that allows for
clustering at the state level.
4. Data
The data including information on people’s subjective well-being as well as indi-
viduals’ industry and a range of individual level control variables come from
the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) (Sweet et al., 1988;
Sweet and Bumpass, 1996). The NSFH is a survey of a nationally representative
sample with three waves of data collection (1987–8, 1992–4, and 2001–8). Our
main analysis is based on the second wave, which has complete data for the
largest cross-section sample of all the three waves; the second wave interviews
first-wave main respondents and their current and their first-wave spouses (if
the latter two are not the same). We use data from the first wave to assess the
robustness of our findings of the institutional variables that are available for the late
1980s; we cannot use third wave data because the third wave does not contain
geographical information.
In the second wave of the NSFH, over 16,000 individuals were interviewed. After
restricting the sample to respondents who report their subjective well-being and the
industrial sector of their current employment and to individuals with non-missing
values for the control variables, as well as after having excluded respondents from
the District of Columbia, our sample contains data for 7,444 individuals.
Individuals from all US states, except North Dakota (due to missing data), are
included in the sample.
The NSFH elicits subjective well-being with the following question: ‘Next are
some questions about how you see yourself and your life. First, taking things all
together, how would you say things are these days?’ Individuals are asked to state
their well-being on a scale from one (very unhappy) to seven (very happy). The
dummy for employment in the public administration is created on the basis of the
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respondent’s industry; it encompasses elected offices and positions in the public
administration.4
Individual level controls are sex, age, race, marital status, religion, and the log of
years of education. Based on the theoretical ideas outlined in Section 2, we add
state-level variables on transparency, auditors, balanced-budget provisions,
regulatory review, and a series of control factors.
Fiscal transparency An index proposed by Alt et al. (2006) is used to measure
transparency. The index includes nine dimensions: (i) is the budget reported
according to GAAP standards? (ii) are multi-year expenditure forecasts prepared?
(iii) what is the frequency of the budget cycle? (iv) are the revenue forecasts
binding? (v) does the legislative branch have (or share) responsibility for the
revenue forecasts? (vi) are all appropriations included in a single bill? (vii) does
a nonpartisan staff write appropriation bills? (viii) is the legislature prohibited from
passing open-ended appropriations? (ix) does the budget require published per-
formance measures? The overall index (available on an annual basis) is a state’s
average score over all available sub-measures.5 In 1993, the index is lowest for
Indiana (with a value of 0.11) and highest for Utah (with a value of 0.89).
State auditing institutions We use two measures to capture a state auditor’s
mandate and independence as proposed by Schelker (2008, 2012). Auditor inde-
pendence is captured with an indicator variable taking value one if the chief auditor
is elected by the citizens and the value zero if he or she is appointed by either the
legislature or the executive. In 1993, 17 US states featured elected chief auditors.
The variable performance audits is an index capturing whether the mandate
includes economy and efficiency audits, program audits, and compliance audits,
which all target the use of public funds. Whenever a form of audit is part of the
mandate, the index is increased by one unit, thus ranging from zero to three. The
average score across the US states is 1.62 for 1993.
Balanced-budget provisions Our main measure captures the strictest form of
balanced-budget requirement, which is a restriction to carryover deficits to the
next budgetary period. The indicator stems from Alt and Lowry (1994) and takes
a value of one if the government is not allowed to carryover a deficit to the next
period, and zero if otherwise. Twenty-four states featured the strictest form of
balanced-budget rule in the United States in 1993. Weaker forms of
balanced-budget laws require that the governor submits a balanced-budget,
where failing this requirement, the legislature must enact a balanced-budget,
..........................................................................................................................................................................
4 The public administration variable encompasses the following industry codes: executive and legislative
offices (900), general government, n.e.c. (901), justice, public order, and safety (910), public finance,
taxation, and monetary policy (921), administration of human resources programs (922), administra-
tion of environmental quality and housing programs (930), administration of economic programs (931),
national security, and international affairs (932).
5 The following states lack information on one or two dimensions: GA, KS, KY, LA, MN, and MT (one
dimension missing) and MA and VT (two dimensions missing). For more details, see Alt et al. (2006).
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while actual deficits can be carried over to the next period simply by borrowing. In
a robustness test we also use an index variable capturing the stringency of the
balanced-budget rule (ACIR, 1987). The index ranges from zero to 10 with
higher values indicating stricter balanced-budget requirements. Note that in
many cases balanced-budget rules have been installed already in the original state
constitutions and did not significantly change over time. Bohn and Inman (1996)
examined all state statutes on budget rules back to 1970 and did not report any
significant changes up to 1994. Balanced-budget rules thus do not reflect reactions
to recent negative fiscal shocks.
Regulatory review The control of administrative rule-making is defined in the
state administrative procedure acts. Four indices measure the restraints
embodied in these acts both de jure and de facto on state government agencies in
the mid-1990s. The indices have been constructed by Grady and Simon (2002),
based on information provided by the actors involved in regulatory review and
oversight. The four indices are related to the four actors with potential formal
power over agencies’ rule-making discretion. These are the governor’s office or
its designee, the office of the attorney general, the legislature (including both the
committee system and the full body), and an independent rules review entity. The
indices can take values between zero and eight. Regulatory review is least
pronounced in Mississippi, which is indicated by an average index value of 0.50;
regulatory review in Maryland is most pronounced, indicated by an average index
value of 4.75.
Control variables In all regressions we include a state’s real per capita income, the
state population in logs, ADA scores, and the state unemployment rate in levels and
interacted with the dummy for public sector employment as additional control
variables. ADA scores proxy political preferences within the electorate of a state
(Anderson and Habel, 2009). The measure relies on the average of the state repre-
sentatives’ ideological position on a conservative-liberal scale ranging from zero to
100. The most conservative state in 1993 is Wyoming with a score of 6.42. The most
liberal state is Hawaii with a score of 87.57.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the dependent variable as well as the
industry and state level variables included in our analysis for the sample in our
baseline regressions. A full list with all the individual level control variables is
reported in the online appendix.
5. Results
5.1 Baseline results
Table 2 reports the baseline regressions using information from the second wave of
the NSFH from 1992–4. Odd numbered columns present models of the form of
eq. (1) with state-level controls, even numbered columns further include state
effects in order to control for unobserved time-invariant state-specific
452 governance, bureaucratic rents, and well-being
heterogeneity. To assess the influence of institutional restrictions on bureaucratic
rents, we focus on the relevant interaction effects. Columns I to VIII include
individual sets of institutional restrictions. An increase in accountability through
strict fiscal transparency rules, the election of state auditors, and stringent
balanced-budget rules is statistically significantly associated with a smaller
well-being differential for the public administration. A one standard deviation
increase of transparency lowers the reported subjective well-being of public admin-
istrators relative to other workers by 0.145 points. If the chief auditor is elected
rather than appointed, the difference is reduced by 0.276 points. A no-carryover
rule is related to a 0.443 points lower difference. As a robustness test, we also use an
alternative measure of budget rules, i.e., the ACIR balanced-budget rules stringency
index.6 Consistent with our main result, the estimated effect is negative, though
only weakly statistically significant (coefficient: 0.037, standard error: 0.021). A
one standard deviation increase of the index reduces the well-being differential by
0.093 points. Overall, our results are consistent with the Hypothesis 1 (transpar-
ency), Hypothesis 2b (elected auditors), and Hypothesis 3 (balanced-budget rules).
Table 1 Summary statistics for the main variables
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Subjective well-being 5.41 1.21 1.00 7.00
Public administration 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Transparency 0.46 0.18 0.11 0.89
Elected auditor 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Performance audits 1.92 1.15 0.00 3.00
No-carryover rules 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
Balanced-budget index 7.54 2.53 0.00 10.00
Governor restraints 3.43 2.60 1.00 8.00
Attorney general restraints 1.78 1.93 0.00 8.00
Legislative restraints 3.40 2.05 0.00 8.00
Ind. commission restraints 1.75 2.94 0.00 8.00
Ln(state income) 9.56 0.12 9.26 9.84
Ln(population) 15.74 0.88 13.05 17.26
Unemployment rate 6.64 1.38 2.60 10.80
ADA scores 46.93 13.42 5.43 87.57
Trust in state government 0.52 0.13 0.15 0.86
Political competition 0.05 0.05 0.23 9.5e-4
Lame duck governor 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00
Term limits 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00
Public sector union density 36.73 17.92 8.30 72.60
Private sector union density 11.05 4.87 2.40 19.60
Notes: Summary statistics for sample in baseline regressions. N = 7,444. Summary statistics for the other
individual level variables are reported in the online Appendix.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
6 We give priority to the no-carryover rule because previous research has shown that this most stringent
budget rule has the most important influence on fiscal outcomes (Poterba, 1994; Bohn and Inman,
1996). A detailed regression output is reported in Table A.3. of the online Appendix.
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They do not support Hypothesis 2a (performance audits) and Hypothesis 4
(regulatory review). Performance audits are not significantly correlated with the
differences in subjective well-being. The same holds for the variables capturing the
limited discretionary rule-making power of civil servants.
So far the individual sets of institutional restrictions were analysed under an
implicit ceteris paribus assumption (or that all other institutional factors are
orthogonal to the ones under study). However, institutions of fiscal transparency
and budget rules might well be correlated and thus capture related aspects of fiscal
accountability. In particular, the index of transparency in the fiscal process is a
composite measure capturing important aspects of all stages of the budget process.
The broadness of the measure allows a comprehensive evaluation of fiscal trans-
parency, but at the same time it makes it more likely that some aspects are partly
captured by other variables as well.
To find the institutional factors that have an independent influence on the
well-being differentials, columns IX and X include all institutional variables sim-
ultaneously. The effects of elected state auditors and strict balanced-budget laws are
again negative and statistically significant. Moreover, the effects are comparable in
size to the previous estimates. In contrast, the effect of fiscal transparency collapses
indicating a correlation between institutions that foster fiscal accountability. In the
case of rule-making restraints, the estimated coefficients remain comparable in size
to the previous (insignificant) estimates. However, the estimated effects of
rule-making restraints imposed by the legislature as well as independent commis-
sions become (marginally) significant. A one standard deviation increase of the
variables capturing rule-making restraints reduces the reported subjective
well-being differential by 0.092 in case of the legislature and by 0.100 in case of
independent commissions.
An interpretation of the basic difference between public administrators and
workers in other industries is difficult as we cannot control for self-selection into
the different industries. We are also reluctant to interpret the cross-section correl-
ations between institutions and the level of subjective well-being as they might well
be biased due to unobserved correlated factors.
Institutional factors might be systematically related to political preferences of the
electorate, to economic performance or to the size of the state. Therefore, we
include state ADA scores, the unemployment rate, state income, and population
as well as the corresponding interactions with employment in the public adminis-
tration in the estimations. In states where more liberal politicians are elected to
congress, a smaller difference is observed. If ADA scores increase by one standard
deviation, any well-being premium of public servants is reduced by between 0.111
and 0.194. None of the economic factors is significantly related to the reported
subjective well-being difference. However, in larger states, the subjective well-being
difference between public administrators and other workers is significantly larger. A
10% increase in population size is related to an increase in the well-being differ-
ential of approximately 0.015 to 0.023.
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For the individual level control variables, the results qualitatively correspond
with the findings in Luttmer (2005) for the same dataset.7
5.2 Robustness
In the following robustness checks we assess various sources of potential bias. First,
we include personal income as a regressor in our empirical model. Second, we
evaluate the sensitivity of our results by excluding individual states from the
sample. Third, we discuss potential endogeneity issues. Fourth, we discuss results
based on the first wave with a smaller overall sample and a smaller sample of states,
pooled estimates including both the first and second wave, and finally the second
wave but restricted to the smaller sample of states from the first wave.
In our baseline specifications we do not include personal income as a regressor
because it may be an important channel through which rents are appropriated. If
we include log income as an additional control variable at the individual level, the
results are virtually identical. For the specifications II, IV, VI, and VIII including
state effects and extended with log income, the coefficients of the interaction terms
with public administration are 0.807 (std. err.: 0.297) for transparency, 0.278
(std. err.: 0.123) for elected auditors, 0.024 (std. err.: 0.052) for performance audits,
0.437 (std. err.: 0.100) for no-carryover rules, 0.001 (std. err.: 0.020) for
governor restraints, 0.007 (std. err.: 0.038) for attorney general restraints, 0.037
(std. err.: 0.034) for legislative restraints, and 0.029 (std. err.: 0.026) for inde-
pendent commission restraints.
To further assess the sensitivity of our results, we repeat our baseline regressions
and exclude one state at a time. Table 3 reports the resulting lower and upper
bound estimates along with the estimates for the full sample from Table 2. Overall,
the results are robust to the exclusion of individual states. The size of the coeffi-
cients for transparency, elected auditors and no-carryover rules are relatively stable,
and all estimates remain significant at conventional levels. The estimates for
rule-making restraints are rather sensitive to the exclusion of individual states:
The upper bound estimates exceed lower bound estimates by a factor of approxi-
mately 4.1 and 6.1 respectively. For the sake of brevity, we omit the estimates from
dimensions other than legislative restraints and independent commission restraints,
which at least in some specifications of Table 2 indicate systematic correlations.
Recall that our identification is based exclusively on the interaction effects and is
as such an application of a differences-in-differences strategy. We do not rely on
general well-being differences between industries or direct correlations between
institutions and reported well-being, but only on well-being differentials condi-
tional on the institutional setup. Therefore, we can control for general unobserved
state-specific heterogeneity by including state effects. However, one might still
worry that some unobserved factor drives both the utility differential as well as
..........................................................................................................................................................................
7 A detailed regression output for the specifications in Table 2, including the coefficients for all
individual level control variables, is reported in Table A.2. of the online Appendix.
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institutions. One such candidate is political preferences of voters. We try to address
this concern by including political preference measures (ADA scores) already in the
baseline regression. Another candidate is the status of the public bureaucracy. If
voters perceive the bureaucracy as competent and trustworthy, public administra-
tors might be happier and at the same time voters might be less inclined to control
the bureaucracy. We address this concern by controlling for the share of respond-
ents indicating ‘a great deal’ or ‘a fair amount’ of trust and confidence in the state
government in a Gallup/ACIR (1992) survey.8 The partial correlation between trust
and the subjective well-being differential is positive, statistically significant, and
ranges from 0.741 (std. err.: 0.317) to 0.978 (std. err.: 0.433). A one standard
deviation increase in trust amounts to a 0.096 to 0.127 higher well-being differen-
tial. This is consistent with the view that there is a positive relation between the
public’s perception of the bureaucracy and potential utility premiums. More im-
portantly, all our previous results are robust to the inclusion of this variable and the
corresponding interaction term. The estimated interaction terms of our institutions
with the public administration indicator are 0.742 (std. err.: 0.283) for transpar-
ency, 0.317 (std. err.: 0.125) for elected auditors, 0.013 (std. err.: 0.053) for
Table 3 Robustness test: exclusion of individual states
Interaction term Coef. Rob. SE
Public administration x transparency 0.818** 0.295
0.674* 0.309 lower bound
1.000** 0.275 upper bound
Public administration x elected auditor 0.276* 0.124
0.219(*) 0.116 lower bound
0.370* 0.145 upper bound
Public administration x no-carryover rules 0.443** 0.098
0.385** 0.091 lower bound
0.488** 0.094 upper bound
Public administration x legislative restraints 0.035 0.033
0.013 0.032 lower bound
0.053 0.034 upper bound
Public administration x ind. commission restraints 0.029 0.025
0.009 0.025 lower bound
0.055* 0.027 upper bound
Notes: (1) This table reports the smallest and the largest coefficients from repeated regressions with one
state excluded at a time; for comparative purposes, the coefficients of the regressions for the whole
sample are also shown; the regressions contain the same set of variables as the regressions in even
columns of Table 2; (2) OLS estimations including state effects; (3) robust standard errors in parentheses
adjusted for clustering on state level; (4) ** is significant at the 99 % level; * at the 95 % level, and (*) at
the 90 % level.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
8 The survey by Gallup/ACIR (1992) is the only survey with specific questions on trust in state
government in the relevant period. The question reads: ‘Overall, how much trust and confidence do
you have in your state government to do a good job in carrying out its responsibilities? ‘A great deal’, ‘A
fair amount’, ‘Not very much’, and ‘None at all’.
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performance audits, 0.450 (std. err.: 0.086) for no-carryover rules, 0.002 (std. err.:
0.022) for governor restraints, 0.020 (std. err.: 0.042) for attorney general restraints,
0.017 (std. err.: 0.037) for legislative restraints, and 0.026 (std. err.: 0.022) for
independent commission restraints.9
An alternative approach to address endogeneity is to estimate instrumental
variables (IV) regressions. However, in the context of political institutions it is
extremely challenging to find valid instruments. Not only has there to be a
strong relation between the endogenous covariate and the instrument in the first
stage, but also the exclusion restriction has to be met. Given these difficulties, the
literature suggests only an instrument for budget rules. Rueben (1997) uses the
voter initiative to instrument budget rules. However, voter initiatives may well have
a direct effect on public employees (e.g., Matsusaka, 2009). When we use the
availability of voter initiatives as an instrument for balanced-budget rules, we do
not find a significant correlation between no-carryover rules and the voter initiative
in the first stage regression.
Our main results are based on the second wave of the NSFH, i.e., for the years
1992–4. We prefer the second to the first wave, because (i) we have observations for
all institutional variables, (ii) it is the larger cross-section, and (iii) it covers more
states. Still, the variables on elected auditors, transparency, and no-carryover rules
are also available for the years of the first wave, 1987–8, with a sample size of 6,152
and 42 states. With this smaller dataset and fewer states, previous results cannot be
replicated. The estimated effects for the interaction terms between public admin-
istrators and transparency (coef.: 0.300; std. err.: 0.398), elected auditor (coef.:
0.133; std. err.: 0.217) as well as no-carryover rules (coef.: 0.157; std. err.:
0.199) are not statistically significant. The difference in the results is not due to
the different coverage of states: Restricting the second wave regressions to the same
sample of states of the first wave (including state effects) does not materially affect
the results.10 The estimated coefficients of the relevant interaction terms are as
follows: transparency 0.843 (std. err.: 0.297), elected auditor 0.278 (std. err.:
0.124), performance audits 0.024 (std. err.: 0.052), no-carryover rule 0.436 (std.
err.: 0.098), governor restraints 0.001 (std. err.: 0.020), attorney general restraints
0.008 (std. err.: 0.038), legislative restraints 0.035 (std. err.: 0.034), and independ-
ent commission restraints 0.029 (std. err.: 0.025). We have no convincing explan-
ation for the first wave results.
When pooling both waves, unsurprisingly, our results become weaker. The inter-
action term of no-carryover rules with public administration remains statistically
significant (coef.: 0.297, std. err.: 0.089), while the interaction effects with trans-
parency (coef.: 0.263, std. err.: 0.189) and elected auditors (coef.: 0.097, std. err.:
0.102) fall below conventional levels of statistical significance.11
..........................................................................................................................................................................
9 Note that the survey only covers 39 states and that our results also remain robust to this restriction of
the sample. The full set of results is reported in Table A.4. of the online Appendix.
10 See Table A.5. of the online Appendix.
11 See Table A.6. of the online Appendix.
s. luechinger, m. schelker, and a. stutzer 459
5.3 Supplementary extensions
Our main interest is on basic political institutions. They shape longer-term factors
that affect public administrators as explained in Sections 2.1 to 2.4 and summarized
in Hypotheses 1–4. Still, as discussed in Section 2.5, theoretical considerations also
suggest current political factors such as political competition, last term effects, and
unionization to affect the control of the public administration.12 These additional
hypotheses are tested in a series of regressions presented in Table 4, which include
measures of political competition, for whether the governor faces a binding term
limit and is a lame duck, and for public and private sector unionization.
The political competition variable stems from Besley et al. (2010) and is based on
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002). The variable combines election results of state
executive offices including governors, lieutenant governors, secretaries of state,
attorney generals, representatives at the US federal level, etc. The measure
captures the average relative vote share of Democrats in state-wide electoral races
and is constructed as the negative absolute difference between the vote share and
0.5. The regression results in column I show a negative and statistically significant
coefficient of the interaction term between political competition and public ad-
ministrator. One standard deviation stronger political competition is associated
with a 0.081 point lower subjective well-being differential. This is consistent with
the interpretation that stronger political competition leads to stronger incentives to
control public administrators.
The incentives of the executive, which is the direct principal of the bureaucracy,
might also affect rent creation in the public administration. The literature in
political economy has shown that executives who face a binding term limit (i.e.,
lame ducks) implement different policies than executives with intact electoral
incentives (e.g., Besley and Case, 1995; List and Sturm, 2006). Besides these last
term effects, it is important to also control for the general effect of term limits,
because the existence of term limits can have independent effects on policy
outcomes (Schelker, 2011). In column 2, the estimated interaction terms between
public administrators and lame duck governors or term limits respectively are not
statistically significant. However, the direction of the effects accords with prior
expectations.
Finally, we estimate the influence of unionization on subjective well-being dif-
ferentials. We include both public and private sector unionization because our
estimation strategy builds on both sectors. We use the union density measures
by Hirsch et al. (2001) who estimate sector-specific shares of union membership
and union coverage. Column 3 reports regression results relying on union
membership, but the estimates are qualitatively equivalent when using union
coverage instead. The estimated effects show that both relevant interaction terms
are not statistically significant. The direction of the effects, however, would be
consistent with the notion that unhappy bureaucrats are more likely to join unions.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
12 We thank an anonymous reviewer for these suggestions.
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6. Conclusions
Voters and elected officials delegate legislative and executive authority to bureau-
cratic agencies. This allows public servants to carry out their responsibilities.
However, it also offers them an opportunity to exploit their monopolistic
position and informational advantage to extract rents. Institutional reforms that
strengthen accountability and reduce the discretionary leeway in the public admin-
istration can alleviate this well-known problem. Such reforms have gained a new
urgency as cash-strapped governments in US states and around the world are
forced to cut back spending. Adequate institutional reforms may provide a way
of reducing spending without the need to reduce services by the same amount.
Our analysis sheds light on the promise of such reforms. The empirical results for
the early 1990s suggest that transparency requirements, public auditors, and
Table 4 Extensions: current political process and the subjective well-being differ-
ential of the public administration
I
...............................
II
...............................
III
...............................
Coef. Robust
SE
Coef. Robust
SE
Coef. Robust
SE
Private sector Reference group
Public administration 0.041 0.055 0.044 0.056 0.053 0.054
Public administration x
political competition
1.582* 0.684
Public administration x
lame duck governor
0.071 0.163
Public administration x
term limits governor
0.197 0.142
Public administration x
public sector union density
0.006 0.005
Public administration x
private sector union density
0.010 0.017
Political competition 0.342 0.387
Lame duck governor 0.137* 0.058
Term limits governor 0.023 0.090
Public sector union density 0.013 0.013
Private sector union density 0.018 0.035
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
State controls Yes Yes Yes
State effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant 5.399** 0.006 5.409** 0.003 5.409** 0.003
Number of observations 7438 7444 7444
Number of clusters 47 49 49
Adj. R squared 0.034 0.034 0.035
Notes: (1) OLS estimations; (2) robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering on state
level; (3) ** is significant at the 99 % level; * at the 95 % level, and (*) at the 90 % level.
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balanced-budget provisions are effective means for reducing bureaucratic rents.
However, given our (partial) failure to replicate the results for earlier years, it
seems to be important to repeat the analysis for other countries and periods for
which data is available.
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